I am a PhD candidate at the Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies (M3CS) whose research focuses on the philosophy of predictive processing and active inference theories. My current work engages with the classical pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce to argue for an inferential 'internalist' interpretation of active inference that doesn't lead to scepticism. I argue such an interpretation provides insights into how we should think about meaning, representation, truth, and justification.
My interest in active inference originally grew from studying perceptual illusions and how such illusions provide key insights into foundational mechanisms the mind employs to represent reality. Previously, I worked in the Time in Brain and Behaviour Lab at The University of Melbourne. There, I investigated a novel motion-based illusion where a single stimulus is perceived in two distinct locations simultaneously.
My interest in active inference originally grew from studying perceptual illusions and how such illusions provide key insights into foundational mechanisms the mind employs to represent reality. Previously, I worked in the Time in Brain and Behaviour Lab at The University of Melbourne. There, I investigated a novel motion-based illusion where a single stimulus is perceived in two distinct locations simultaneously.