I am a PhD candidate at the Monash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies (M3CS) whose research focuses on the philosophy of predictive processing and active inference theories. In my current work I argue that predictive processing theories can provide the conceptual resources for an inferential 'internalist' account of consciousness that doesn't lead to scepticism, combining insights from cognitive neuroscience, analytic philosophy, and the classical pragmatism of C. S. Peirce.
My interest in active inference originally grew from studying perceptual illusions and how such illusions provide key insights into foundational mechanisms the mind employs to represent reality. Previously, I worked in the Time in Brain and Behaviour Lab at the University of Melbourne. There, I investigated a novel motion-based illusion where a single stimulus is perceived in two distinct locations simultaneously.
My interest in active inference originally grew from studying perceptual illusions and how such illusions provide key insights into foundational mechanisms the mind employs to represent reality. Previously, I worked in the Time in Brain and Behaviour Lab at the University of Melbourne. There, I investigated a novel motion-based illusion where a single stimulus is perceived in two distinct locations simultaneously.